

Springfield Utility Board

2024 Ice Storm After Action Report

November 2024

HAGERTY

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Executive Summary

The January 2024 Ice Storm was unprecedented in both scale and impact on Springfield Utility Board's (SUB) service territory. In recent years, SUB has demonstrated its ability to respond to emergency incidents and support other utilities in their response. However, in 2024 it was SUB who requested help as it rebuilt parts of the electric backbone in punishing conditions, while battling telecommunications and water infrastructure challenges. SUB employees worked tirelessly, working long shifts for days on end both in the office and in the field to restore service to their community. Each employee demonstrated a commitment to their roles in aiding restoration as they navigated a level of damage far beyond what any member had seen before.

SUB is not alone in their efforts to adapt to novel extreme weather. As global conditions change, utilities of all sizes are struggling to prepare for and respond to incidents that surpass their current capabilities. The issue is further complicated since it is not only utilities that face this challenge. This event also tested the capabilities of the City and County emergency response.

Through each interview conducted by Hagerty, the willingness and desire for SUB employees to make improvements so that they can be better positioned when the next event occurs was evident. This report analyzes the elements of SUB's response that were effective as well as the elements that could be improved. It is broken into three categories: Information Sharing, Operational Coordination, and Resources and Technology. Hagerty made eight observations and a total of 16 recommendations spanning the three categories.

1. **Observation 1**: SUB's communications to the public did not meet customers' needs.
2. **Observation 2:** The scale of the boil water notice exceeded SUB's established procedure for water quality notifications.
3. **Observation 3:** Internal coordination and communications were not adequate for the scale of the storm response.
4. **Observation 4:** SUB and the City of Springfield had differing understandings of their roles and responsibilities following an event of this magnitude.
5. **Observation 5:** SUB's restoration prioritization did not appear to be widely understood by partners
6. **Observation 6:** SUB's outage reporting system could not handle the scale of the incident.

7. **Observation 7:** SUB struggled to provide restoration timelines to the public.
8. **Observation 8:** SUB relied on forecasting that did not consider specific impacts to electric utility infrastructure.

We commend SUB's commitment to improving the organization's emergency preparedness and response, as demonstrated by engaging in both an internal and external AAR process. We look forward to SUB's continued development of its emergency preparedness program.

Introduction

Purpose

Following the Ice Storm, SUB conducted an internal after-action report (AAR), during which time they solicited feedback from employees and customers and aggregated the findings into key themes, strengths, and weaknesses. Due to the unprecedented nature of the incident, SUB elected to hire an independent vendor to conduct an external AAR to validate their findings and identify any additional gaps.

SUB enlisted Hagerty Consulting (Hagerty) to provide an outside perspective on their response to the 2024 Ice Storm.[1] This AAR captures key lessons learned from the event and identifies actionable recommendations to ensure SUB is best postured for future events.

Methodology

Hagerty's AAR process consisted of reviewing emergency preparedness and event-specific documents and facilitating a series of stakeholder interviews.

The document review provided a foundational understanding of the activities that occurred in response to the event and how those activities compare to the expected actions outlined in SUB's emergency plans (i.e., what occurred versus what SUB expected to occur).

Individual and group interviews allowed Hagerty to obtain additional or clarifying information. The Hagerty team pursued a bottom-up approach to scheduling stakeholder engagements with SUB, starting with operational personnel, such as field crews. These initial interviews informed Hagerty's questions to management and executive SUB personnel. Hagerty also conducted interviews with external partners involved in SUB's emergency response, including personnel from the City of Springfield and Lane County. For a list of documents reviewed and individuals interviewed, please see Appendix A (Appendix A, p.19).

[1] Hagerty Consulting is an emergency management consulting firm with experience working with government, commercial, and utility clients to help them prepare for and respond to disasters.

Incident Overview

Event Summary


The 2024 Ice Storm was one of the most severe and damaging winter storms to hit Springfield, Oregon. Weather forecasts anticipated freezing rain in Lane County, but the forecasts were unable to accurately predict the areas that would be most impacted. The Eugene-Springfield area experienced more precipitation than other parts of the Willamette Valley, which combined with the low temperatures to create heavy icing on roads, trees, and power infrastructure.

The initial freezing rain created dangerous road conditions and led to some outages in SUB's service area. Once the weather subsided, SUB began the power restoration process only to have most of their work undone by a second wave of freezing rain. These subsequent weather events, further compounded by cold load pick up, caused extensive damage to SUB's assets.

This damage resulted in unprecedented restoration times, lasting for 11 days following the five-day storm.



Event Timeline



- **Friday, January 12, 2024:** SUB was tracking storm predictions slated to impact their service area. SUB worked with the City of Springfield and Lane County as they prepared for the storm ahead. **Due to the uncertainties in the weather forecast**, **the SUB Executive Management Team (EMT) did not fully activate their storm response pre-emptively.**
- **Saturday, January 13, 2024: The ice storm began**. By 13:15 SUB had received reports of initial power outages and activated field crews to respond. At 18:30, SUB reported that they had resolved some outages but that new outages were also being reported. By 20:30, **SUB issued an emergency declaration** and reported that crews would rest overnight before continuing restoration in the morning.
- **Sunday, January 14, 2024: SUB issued mutual aid requests** to neighboring utility companies to support the response. At this point, SUB estimated that 6,000 customers were without power. SUB warned that customers could face an extended period without power. By 12:00, warming weather caused new damage to infrastructure as melting ice stressed trees. At 15:45, SUB shared their restoration priorities with the public.
- **Monday, January 15, 2024: SUB issued a request for replacement distribution poles**. SUB estimated 11,000 customers were without power. SUB shared on their website that their team were making progress with the restoration, but that more weather was

forecast to slow restoration and cause new damage to the already weakened infrastructure.

- **Tuesday, January 16, 2024: Springfield experienced a second wave of freezing rain**. SUB reiterated via their daily update page that customers may face extended time without power. Despite continuing restoration efforts, more poles fell, and SUB updated their estimate to 25,000 customers losing or going to lose power due to the storm. **The City of Springfield declares a state of emergency and the Lane County Board of Commissioners declares a local emergency**.
- **Wednesday, January 17, 2024: SUB issued a boil water advisory**. **Lane County activated their Emergency Operations Center (EOC). SUB released its first estimated restoration time.** Mutual aid crews arrived. The freezing rain the day before set the restoration process back significantly due to the freezing and warming of trees. SUB said that over 40 poles were down. SUB stated that customers without power should prepare for a week-long outage.
- **Thursday, January 18, 2024:** SUB reported that their meter readers were conducting wellness checks and delivering water to customers.
- **Friday, January 19, 2024: SUB lifted the boil water advisory**. SUB announced that a map of the current power outages was available on the SUB website.
- **Tuesday, January 23, 2024:** Repairs continued. SUB expected to restore power to most customers by the weekend (January 27-28).
- **Thursday, January 24, 2024:** The City of Springfield EOC split off from County EOC, which was deactivated.
- **Sunday, January 28, 2024:** SUB announced that the **initial power restoration process was complete**.

Observations and Recommendations

The observations and recommendations Hagerty identified fall into three categories: Information Sharing, Operational Coordination, and Resources and Technology. Each category includes a series of observations, each of which provides a narrative summary and associated recommendations. This report is not structured in order of priority, though some recommendations have been grouped thematically.

Information Sharing

Observation 1: **SUB's communications to the public did not meet customers' needs.**

External communications were overly reliant on social media and internet access. SUB used Facebook and the SUB website as the primary modes of communication, which were not accessible to all customers due to the power outage. This limited SUB customers' ability to receive updates on response and restoration progress, and in turn made it difficult for customers to make decisions in response to the storm, e.g., remaining in their primary residence or departing.

Other modes of emergency communication to SUB customers were not sufficiently tested and were therefore unable to be used during the event. Prior to the Ice Storm, SUB had been developing a text message system to be used for employees in emergency situations. However, this system was not ready to be deployed to communicate with customers at the time of the Ice Storm. SUB has since begun developing this capability for wide-spread notifications.

In addition to the modes of communication, SUB's emergency plans did not provide clear guidance on the process of developing, approving, and distributing public messages or an ideal cadence. These challenges relating to external communications led to delays and frustration from personnel involved in the response, and from customers who wanted more frequent updates.

- **Recommendation 1.1:** SUB should develop the capability to notify their customers of outages and estimated restoration times through text. SUB should prepare templated language for emergency text messages in English and Spanish, reducing the time between impacts and public messaging. This system should also include messaging

relating to boil water notices. *See Observation 2.* SUB should also test their emergency text message system internally with their employees bi-annually.

- **Recommendation 1.2:** SUB should build internal capacity to proactively engage in diverse means of communication by incorporating strategies into their Emergency Communications Plan and practice using those methods. SUB employed many methods of communication during this event including television, radio, social media, and website updates, however there could be efficiencies made in the rate at which these strategies were employed.
- **Recommendation 1.3:** SUB should identify two staff from the EMT, in addition to the Public Information Officer (PIO), to be responsible for serving as the public face of SUB. Public facing communication should be limited to these three representatives and they should receive media training once every two years. Having multiple individuals trained for public communication allows SUB to have a selection of employees to draw on and decide who is appropriate for each scenario.

Observation 2: The scale of the boil water notice exceeded SUB's established procedure for water quality notifications.

Four days into the storm, the power outage impacted SUB's source water facility, prompting SUB to issue a boil water notice to an area larger than it had ever had to provide such a notice. SUB's typical boil water notice procedure was effective for small areas that could be notified with physical notes placed on customers' homes. However, issuing a boil water notice at such a large scale during a large outage and in the face of treacherous road conditions exceeded SUB's capabilities.

The process for issuing the boil water notice at this scale caused confusion amongst SUB's customers, and did not reach customers without internet. While SUB did publish a map of the impacted area, the map did not provide sufficient detail to identify precisely who was impacted, making it difficult for impacted customers to determine whether they were in the impacted area. SUB has since implemented a system that can provide more accurate information to SUB's customers.

Many customers called SUB's customer service center seeking clarification. However, at the early stages of the notice SUB's call center staff were not aware of the boil water notice. While they had been notified through email, this was not regularly monitored by call center staff, leaving them unable to comment on the notice, compounding customers' frustrations.

- **Recommendation 2.1:** SUB should engage Lane County Public Health to understand how it can support SUB in issuing boil water notices in the future. SUB may benefit from the County's experience communicating public health and water quality issues to the public. For such a relationship to be effective, SUB will need to leverage its new boil water notice system to provide more granular information to Lane County.

Operational Coordination

Observation 3: Internal coordination and communications were not adequate for the scale of the storm response.

The internal coordination referred to in this observation is specific to communication outside of the impacted business unit. The operational communication between the Incident Commander and electric operation staff was continuous and robust throughout the response.

Internal coordination within and between SUB's leadership and divisions during the response did not always occur at a regular or preplanned cadence involving the entire leadership team, impeding the collective situational awareness of SUB's leadership team and operational personnel.

For example, interviewees noted that while EMT calls did occur daily, the EMT's relationship to the Incident Command structure was not clearly articulated in emergency plans. SUB's emergency plans also did not articulate the distinction between the roles and responsibilities of the EMT during normal operations, the EMT during an emergency, and Incident Command structures during an emergency event.

While this issue was inter-divisional, coordination challenges also existed within divisions. Operational personnel within the Water Service Center (WSC) explained that they did not receive regular updates on the status of SUB's response, limiting the WSC's situational awareness.

Beyond EMT, Electric Service Center (ESC), and WSC structures, SUB also faced other challenges relating to internal communications. Of note, the process in place for the internal review and dissemination of public communications required multiple layers of approval before they were published. This resulted in delayed messaging to both SUB personnel and their customers.

The communications challenges identified in this report reflect the need for strengthened planning, training, and exercise efforts for communication that integrate the operational communication with the supporting business units. This will ensure leadership in supporting business units and government partners have a clearer understanding of their roles and responsibilities during a response.

SUB had not recently trained or exercised their emergency response plans in an integrated manner. SUB has two emergency response structures, one for ESC and one for WSC. While the ESC stood up its Incident Command, the WSC did not stand up its Incident Command during the response. An incident of this scale would typically require an organization-wide response. While SUB personnel responded to the best of their abilities, improved planning, training, and exercise activities would have enhanced SUB's response.

Further, the Electric Service Emergency Procedures for Large Outages Plan and SUB Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) provide conflicting information on which individual is responsible for internal communication, and neither plan identifies the details and expectations of that responsibility. As a result, internal communications were lacking during the response and situational awareness varied across different groups within SUB.

- **Recommendation 3.1:** While detailed job descriptions for EMT roles exist in the EOP, there is an opportunity to develop more robust emergency response job aids for the EMT and for every staff member staffing Incident Command. Each EMT and Incident Command member should have access to a job aid that provides a checklist for priority activities following an incident. These documents will help ensure SUB's response is repeatable, and that staff can be trained and exercised in preparation for a real-world event.
- **Recommendation 3.2:** EMT and Incident Command staff should conduct a joint tabletop exercise annually that focuses on extended outages. This exercise cadence will help SUB identify planning and training needs at all levels of the organization.
- **Recommendation 3.3:** SUB should identify an individual responsible for leading internal communications during an emergency, and more clearly articulate that individual's roles and responsibility.
- **Recommendation 3.4:** The ESC and WSC should train on and exercise the SUB EOP, WSC Emergency Response Plan, and ESC Emergency Procedures for Large Scale Outages on an annual basis. While annual training and review of these plans occurs every Fall, there is an opportunity to expand these trainings to the entire organization. SUB may also consider developing a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (MYTEP) that outlines a long-term training and exercise strategy and associated goals. This should include exercising the Incident Commands of both ESC and WSC together.

- **Recommendation 3.5:** While SUB does have a list of annexes that cover a range of issues, SUB should add the following annexes to its EOP. While some of these issues are covered in existing material, SUB's personnel and its partners could benefit from more detail.
  - **Boil Water Annex:** SUB should develop Boil Water Notice annex to its Emergency Operations Plan. The annex should be developed in partnership with City and County government partners, including departments of public health and public works. Such an approach will encourage information sharing at crucial junctures during incident response.
  - **Call Center Annex:** SUB should document in greater detail its internal Call Center capability into the EOP to describe how it will support operations and information sharing during incidents, how it will ensure gaps and unmet needs are being triaged and directed to external partners, and training to ensure staff can effectively augment call center capacity.
  - **External Communications Annex:** An external communications annex should be developed in partnership with key stakeholders and include reference to how SUB communicates with SUB customers and government agencies (including but not limited to emergency operations centers, public safety, and public health) during an emergency, to include the specifics of a liaison function and a joint information system. A process for documenting and vetting all external messages should be included, in addition to a detailed job aid and associated checklist that clarifies the roles, responsibilities, and expectations for the PIO.
  - **Operational Coordination Annex:** The annex should include templated meeting agendas and cadences for leadership and all-staff calls, the information needs of the EMT, and a process for providing operational updates to all staff. Roles and responsibilities for leaders on each call should also be established.

    At a minimum, this should include:
    - Morning and evening Operations Briefing (Incident Command, led by the Incident Commander)
    - Morning and evening EMT-Incident Commander Briefing (Incident Commander briefing EMT)
    - Morning All Staff Briefing (email)
    - Ad hoc All Staff updates (email), e.g., boil water notifications

- **Resource Mobilization Annex:** Per recommendation 3.6, SUB should include a plan for how it will access non-operational resources (e.g., food and water, heating centers, personnel lodging, PIOs, community volunteers) during an incident using local, regional, and state government and utility resource networks.
- **Other Annexes to consider:** Information Technology, Cyber, Business Continuity Plan

- **Recommendation 3.6:** SUB should engage Lane County Emergency Management to explore opportunities to request additional PIO and communications specialist support through regional and statewide networks. Additional personnel will increase SUB's capacity to communicate with their broad collection of stakeholders and improve collaboration with broader information systems that might be activated by government partners during regional and statewide events. This can also be achieved by establishing contracts for PIO assistance under blue sky conditions.

Observation 4: SUB and the City of Springfield had differing understandings of their roles and responsibilities following an event of this magnitude.

While this report focuses on SUB's opportunities for improvement, utilities are only a piece of the response to a weather event, and understanding SUB's operational relationship with government partners is critical in identifying areas for improvement.

Interviews with both SUB and the City showed a mutual misunderstanding regarding who was responsible for elements of response and restoration. For instance, citizens' unmet needs – or humanitarian elements of incident response – are typically the responsibility of government entities, whereas restoring power is typically the responsibility of the utility. This is reflected in SUB's EOP. Hagerty's interviews with both SUB and the City indicated that each party assumed the other would be responsible for meeting citizens' unmet needs.

For example, early in the response, SUB identified a need for wellness checks for community members in Springfield and asked that the City activate the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT). The City denied this request due to the hazardous weather conditions, reports of threats against SUB employees, and the scale of the task, and instead expected SUB to fulfil this role. SUB was also not equipped to meet this need.

Emergency response responsibilities between cities and utilities are often determined through mutual planning efforts. Such efforts would determine activation thresholds

defining the severity of the incident and associated response actions by each entity. Neither were apparent in Springfield. The June 2023 Eugene-Springfield Multi-Jurisdictional Emergency Operations Plan does not provide detail on government-utility ways of working during an incident. There is no Incident Annex relating to extended power outages and the Incident Annex relating to winter storms offers limited detail. The document does note that Emergency Managers in Springfield are responsible for managing training and exercises in the City. The Hagerty team could not identify recent examples of SUB being invited to participate in City-led emergency management training or exercise initiatives.

A more proactive emergency management partnership between the City and SUB would undoubtedly have been helpful, and responsibility for the extended outage does not fall on the City. However, following the Ice Storm the City EOC almost immediately integrated into the County's EOC structure. This hindered SUB's ability to leverage its City relationships, which was further complicated by the County appointing an acting emergency manager in the absence of a full-time emergency management professional.

The nature of the SUB-City of Springfield response is indicative of a lack of joint planning for an event of this magnitude, with each entity making assumptions about the other's responsibilities during an emergency, impeding the response. For example, SUB's call center fielded calls relating to system outages and restoration, but also to citizens' welfare and unmet needs, overloading SUB's telephone lines. SUB also allocated staff to conduct welfare checks, as opposed to focusing on their primary objective of restoring power. There is an opportunity for both parties to strengthen their emergency management partnership and readiness.

- **Recommendation 4.1:** SUB and the City of Springfield, in partnership with Lane County as appropriate, should establish regular planning, training, and exercise activities. This could include a facilitated Ice Storm debrief between the Mayor, the City Emergency Manager, and SUB's EMT.

  Establishing a deeper blue sky emergency management relationship – through planning, training, and exercise activities – would allow each entity to validate who is responsible for what during a response and codify it in their respective plans. Agreeing who is meeting the public's unmet needs, such as welfare checks, heating centers, and water delivery, should be a priority for this process. It is common practice for the City or County to meet these humanitarian needs during a natural disaster.

Observation 5: SUB's restoration prioritization did not appear to be widely understood by partners, staff, and customers.

SUB has an established order of restoration that they followed in January 2024. However, SUB was not successful in communicating restoration prioritization to external partners. Ensuring SUB's restoration prioritization is defensible, repeatable, and widely understood will minimize uncertainty from the public and from government partners and minimize the opportunity for the ad hoc restoration of circuits.

Customer uncertainty around restoration timelines and prioritization dominated the narrative relating to SUB's response, reducing the opportunity for positive stories relating to the hard work of the SUB team. A closer partnership between the City and SUB would ensure SUB better manages the expectations of its customers and City partners.

- **Recommendation 5.1:** SUB should hold restoration prioritization workshops with their internal staff as well as the City of Springfield, during which time SUB would share its restoration prioritization criteria and protocols and elicit feedback from City partners, e.g., identifying additional critical loads. While SUB does provide information surrounding prioritization in customer bills prior to storm season, this workshop would also provide an opportunity for SUB to explain how circuits are restored, and what exigencies might impact circuit restoration (such as those experienced during the Ice Storm).

Resources and Technology

Observation 6: SUB's outage reporting system could not handle the scale of the incident.

The call-based reporting system led to redundant work orders, limited internal visibility on restoration progress, and confusing messaging for customers surrounding power outages.

SUB's call center system exceeded its capacity, preventing outgoing calls. In addition, SUB did not have an alternative method of receiving outage information such as online reporting.

- **Recommendation 6.1:** Per earlier observations and recommendation 3.5, SUB should develop more detailed plans relating to call center protocols during an emergency such as an annex to be used by customer service. More detailed planning may minimize the load on SUB's existing network, e.g., by ensuring calls for welfare checks can be redirected.
- **Recommendation 6.2:** While SUB is a utility that is built around a call-based system, it could be useful to explore systems that integrate an online outage submission option. This would both allow for increased input from customers and provide the ability to filter for emergency issues such as downed powerlines. SUB could also explore systems with more robust features such as automatically identifying adjacent outages to predict if the issue is a single house, a lateral, or a feeder.

Observation 7: SUB struggled to provide restoration timelines to the public.

SUB did not provide estimated timelines for restoration to its customers. The lack of visibility of their system status prevented SUB from giving customers an idea of when to expect their power to be restored. Additionally, the level of damage exceeded SUB's traditional estimation methods.

- **Recommendation 7.1:** Per earlier observations and recommendation 3.6, SUB should include a protocol for regular communications to impacted customers. While SUB may not be able to provide accurate estimated timelines for restoration, it is critical for SUB to provide general estimates on a targeted timeline to allow customers the ability to make other arrangements if necessary.

Observation 8: SUB relied on forecasting data that was later identified as insufficient.

Prior to the storm, SUB leadership participated in meetings with a representative from the Portland office of the National Weather Service. This information was used to determine the severity of impact and determine what resources to activate. It was later identified that there are radar gaps in the Springfield Area and more detailed weather analysis could have assisted leadership in decision making.

Recommendation 8.1: SUB should explore free or subscription-based meteorology services to ensure it has a clearer understanding of how inbound weather will impact SUB's infrastructure. SUB could also explore partnering with the City of Springfield or Lane County to access more advanced meteorology services, or alternatively explore partnering with neighboring investor-owned utilities.

Conclusion

Despite unprecedented damage to their infrastructure, the SUB team showed their dedication to Springfield through their tireless efforts to restore service to its customers. Team members repeatedly went above and beyond to support their colleagues, often taking on roles that were outside of their day job and working extremely long hours.

The challenges SUB faced in this incident are not uncommon to utilities, irrespective of their size, and many of the findings were familiar to the Hagerty team.

Hagerty has offered recommendations to support SUB as it strengthens its emergency preparedness program. The following two recommendations are those that Hagerty recommends SUB prioritizes to ensure SUB is best placed to respond to a future incident. These priorities acknowledge SUB is operating in a resource constrained environment, and that the success of SUB's response is contingent on robust partnership working with its government partners.

- **Recommendation 3.4:** The ESC and WSC should train on and exercise the SUB Emergency Operations Plan, WSC Emergency Response Plan, and ESC Emergency Procedures for Large Scale Outages on an annual basis. While annual training and review of these plans occurs every Fall, there is an opportunity to expand these trainings to the entire organization. SUB may also consider developing a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (MYTEP) that outlines a long-term training and exercise strategy and associated goals. This should include exercising the Incident Commands of both ESC and WSC together.
- **Recommendation 4.1:** SUB and the City of Springfield, in partnership with Lane County as appropriate, should establish regular planning, training, and exercise activities.

Appendix A

List of Documents Reviewed

Plans, Polices, and Procedures

1. SUB Emergency Operations Plan 2023
2. Water Service Center Emergency Response Plan
3. Eugene-Springfield Area Multi-Jurisdictional Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan
4. Electric Service Emergency Procedures for Large Outages
5. Electric Large Outages Roles
6. Communications Liaison Role Plan
7. SUB Event Reporting Operating Plan
8. SUB Organizational Chart
9. Springfield City Code Chapter XI, Sections 36-46
10. Information and Technology Emergency Response and Data Restoration Plan
11. March Annual Event Reporting operating plan 2024

Ice Storm Documents

1. SUB Internal AAR
2. AAR Strengths and Weaknesses Feedback
3. January 2024 Ice Storm Weather Event Summary
4. Ice Storm Customer Email Comments
5. Ice Storm AAR Internal Survey Questions
6. Ice Storm AAR Internal Survey Responses
7. SUB EOC Situation Reports (12)
8. Sanjeev's Daily Update Emails

List of Interviews

1. Electrical Operations and Fleet (group interview)
2. Water Operations (group interview)
3. Customer Service and IT Representatives
4. David Embleton
5. Meredith Clark
6. Jeff Nelson
7. Sanjeev King
8. Greg Miller
9. Tracy Sutten
10. Eric Smith
11. Nicole Dalke
12. Cynthia Scoble
13. Nick Amann
14. Brandon Harper
15. City Emergency Management/First Responders
16. County Emergency Management
17. Board Member Teri Dillon
18. Board Member Ryan Thomas
19. Board Member John DeWenter
20. Board David Willis